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The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry
KENNETH L. KARST*
Washington v. Davis1 was as ill a wind as any experienced by
our constitutional law in recent memory; yet it has already pro-
duced some positive results. It has, after all, supplied a doctrinal
basis for overruling Palmer v. Thompson.2 It has also given us
this Colloquium.
Professors Simon3 and Clark4 both argue, persuasively, that an
improper motive for governmental action is independently rele-
vant to the question of the action's constitutionality, irrespective
of any showing that the action produces harmful effects. In the ra-
cial context, Professor Simon appears to stake out a broader
ground, arguing that the question of prejudiced motive is the
question on which constitutionality turns. Both authors agree that
the effects of governmental action may be evidence of improper
motive-a proposition having the support of the Supreme Court
itself, at least when the effects leave little room for doubting the
presence of an improper motive.5
The easy case is the one in which the government acts for an
evil purpose and achieves it. Palmer v. Thompson was such a
case, despite the Court's pretense that the closing of the city's
swimming pools in response to a desegregation order had only ra-
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. AKB., University of
California, Los Angeles, 1950; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1953.
1. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
2. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
3. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of
the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DiNGo L, REV. 1041
(1978).
4. Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional
Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953 (1978).
5. E.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
August 1978 Vol. 15 No. 5
1163
cially neutral effects. 6 What is troubling is the opposite sugges-
tion: that an improper motive is not only a sufficient condition for
holding governmental action unconstitutional, but a necessary
condition for that result. Washington v. Davis and its ungainly
progeny 7 oblige us to live with this principle for a season. To the
extent that Professors Clark and Simon are making the best of
this gloomy situation, we should be grateful for their contribu-
tions to a doctrinal scheme that in some extreme cases may mod-
erate the corrosive effects of Washington v. Davis. Professor
Simon, however, seems to be going much further, not only tolerat-
ing Washington v. Davis but making its principle the central fea-
ture of a constitutional theory of racial equality.8 In this comment
I sketch two reasons why such a motive-centered theory, if it be-
comes entrenched as constitutional doctrine, will damage the
cause of racial justice in this country.
A doctrine demanding proof of a racially prejudiced motive
before governmental action can be held unconstitutional will fo-
cus a court's inquiry on the good faith of various officials. Even
so, much of the evidence in such a race-relations case will neces-
sarily be devoted to proving the harmful and racially dispropor-
tionate effects of the action. One of the oldest maxims of the
common law holds that "[elvery man must be taken to contem-
plate the probable consequences of the act he does." 9 Justice Ste-
vens wrote a special concurrence in Washington v. Davis to make
sure that this evidentiary door was kept open.10 However, even
though the proof will center on the effects of what officials have
done, the ultimate issue will be posed in terms of the goodness or
the evil of the officials' hearts. Courts have long regarded such in-
quiries as unseemly, as the legislative investigation cases of the
1950's attest."l The principal concern here is not that tender judi-
cial sensibilities may be bruised, but that a judge's reluctance to
challenge the purity of other officials' motives may cause her to
fail to recognize valid claims of racial discrimination even when
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1164
[vo.- 15: 1163, 19781 Motive-Centered Inquiry
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the motives for governmental action are highly suspect. Because
an individual's behavior results from the interaction of a multi-
tude of motives, and because racial attitudes often operate at the
margin of consciousness, in any given case there almost certainly
will be an opportunity for a government official to argue that his
action was prompted by racially neutral considerations. When
that argument is made, should we not expect the judge to give the
official the benefit of the moral doubt? When the governmental
action is the product of a group decision, will not that tendency
toward generosity be heightened?
The first objection to a motive-centered doctrine of racial dis-
crimination, then, is that it places a "very heavy burden"12 of per-
suasion on the wrong side of the dispute, to the severe detriment
of the constitutional protection of racial equality. The second ob-
jection is even more serious. A motive-centered theory forces the
litigants in a race case into name-calling on one side and self-
righteousness on the other. The parties, like the judge, will treat
the facts of racial inequality (in education, in housing, or in other
areas) as though their only importance were the light they might
throw on the question of officials' motivational purity. However,
the facts of racial inequality are the real problem. It is bad
enough that a motive-centered inquiry should distract the lawsuit
from focusing on the community's real ills. Worse still is the ef-
fect of this inquiry on race relations outside the litigation process.
The effective parties to the typical racial discrimination case, as
distinguished from the named parties, are institutional liti-
gants-for example, the NAACP versus the school board or the
city planners. These people are locked into a continuing relation-
ship, touching a number of race-relations issues. They were nego-
tiating before the lawsuit began, and they will be dealing with
each other after it ends-if, indeed, a school desegregation case
ever ends. A constitutional doctrine of racial discrimination cen-
tered on the motives of government officials will inevitably poison
the atmosphere for these negotiations. Name-calling and indigna-
tion will, to some significant extent, displace the effort to deal
with the racial inequality itself. The improvement of race rela-
tions is difficult enough when the parties to such negotiations
concern themselves with the questions of the actual extent of ra-
12. This is the Court's term for the presumption the state must overcome in or-
der to justify explicit racial discrimination. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
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cial inequalities and with the costs of lessening them. When accu-
sations of bad faith are added to the mix, the resulting negative
emotional charge can only hinder the process of healthy resolu-
tion of a community's racial problems.
To focus constitutional doctrine on the facts of racial inequality
and on the costs of equalization would not disable the courts from
dealing with clear-cut cases of improper governmental motive;
abandoning Washington v. Davis, in other words, need not revive
Palmer v. Thompson. A court fully persuaded that a government
official has acted for the purpose of harming members of a racial
minority should hold the official's action unconstitutional when
the action causes harm to its intended victims. Where the evi-
dence is less clear, but the judge is conscious that an official may
have acted for an evil purpose, no constitutional doctrine will
erase this consciousness. A court suspecting an improper govern-
mental motive, however, need not make such a finding explicit in
order to hold the action invalid. Rather, the court can examine
closely the governmental interest offered in justification for the
action that has produced racially disproportionate harm. If the
court concludes that the action does not significantly promote a
legitimate and important governmental objective, it can strike
down the action because of its racially disproportionate harms
without any discussion of motive at all.13
In a number of first amendment decisions, many of them with
racial overtones, the Supreme Court has adopted this course. The
Court has, for example, given protection to the constitutional in-
terest in associational privacy in cases in which governmental
motives were suspect; but it has managed to do so without saying,
for example, that the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee
was seeking to expose individuals for exposure's sake, 14 or that
the Arkansas legislature wanted to expose members of the
NAACP holding teaching jobs so they could be hounded out of
their employment. 15 By avoiding accusations of bad faith, the
Court surely avoided handing a political weapon to the racial in-
transigents in these two states. Now that the problem of racial in-
equality is seen clearly as a national problem, should not the
Court draw wisdom from its own experience in assisting the birth
of the New South?
13. See generally Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theo-
ries of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. I Rev. 36, 36 (1977).
14. Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investig'n Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
15. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE
FRsT AMENDWENT 65-121 (1965), for discussion of a series of decisions, including
Gibson and Shelton, which raise the problem of anti-NAACP legislative motiva-
tion.
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